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In this thesis, we examine the current levels of 
cultural understanding and irregular warfare being taught 
in U.S. Army conventional military schools.  Given 
engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is our view that 
the military needs a deeper understanding of the indigenous 
people due to the extremely close and on-going interaction 
between American Soldiers and the local populations.  
Current analysis of the difficulties being reported 
suggests U.S. Army Soldiers are having trouble combating 
irregular warfare due to cultural misunderstandings and a 
lack of counter-insurgency training, thereby reflecting a 
likely educational gap in the U.S. Army’s formal military 
educational training system.   
This thesis analyzes the current problems and 
difficulties Soldiers are reported to be having while 
attempting to combat irregular forces in non-western 
environments.  We analyze the amount of training U.S. Army 
Soldiers receive in cultural understanding and irregular 
warfare in the military schools pipeline and conclude that 
there is a connection between problems Soldiers currently 
face and a lack of training for the conduct of operations 
in foreign countries.  We propose a number of solutions to 
overcome these suspected gaps in education and suggested 
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1 
I. A KNOCK AT THE DOOR  
For most…the matter of learning is one of 
personal preference. But for [military] officers, 
the obligation to learn, to grow in their 
profession, is clearly a public duty. 
     ---General Omar N. Bradley  
Wham! Wham! Wham!  The young teenage Iraqi boy, Haroun 
Fadhil, instantly thought that thieves were trying to break 
into his home.  Living in a crime-infested neighborhood and 
wanting to protect his family, Haroun reached for an AK-47 
assault rifle—one per family is allowed by U.S. authorities 
in Iraq.  But the intruders were not thieves. Instead they 
were members of an 82d Airborne Infantry squad who were 
acting on a “tip” that lead them to Haroun’s door.  In 
textbook fashion, right out of Field Manual 7-8, the squad 
burst through the door yelling in languages the boy did not 
understand.  Conflicting stories from both sides mask what 
actually happened next; however, no one can dispute the 
fact that when the gunfire and explosions ceased: two Iraqi 
civilians were dead, four U.S. Soldiers were injured, six 
apartments were shot up, and trust between U.S. Soldiers 
and the Iraqi civilian population had been further eroded.  
The Americans called the raid a “by the book” operation 
that used a “knock and talk” approach with an appropriate 
degree of force (Peterson, 2003).   
Unfortunately, the Americans do not have all the 
“books” they need to properly deal with an insurgency, and 
understand and work with the local population.  For one, 
the U.S. force could not communicate with the Iraqis—they 
had no interpreter or member of the Iraqi police force 
accompanying them.  Furthermore, U.S. Soldiers lacked 
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adequate educational training regarding Iraqi culture—such 
training sheds light on why approximately 99% of all “tips” 
are erroneous (Packer, 2003).   
Numerous first-hand accounts, reports, and news 
articles prove how little Soldiers understand about the 
cultures of the countries in which they are currently 
fighting; this lack of understanding, in turn, has 
compounded mistakes and problems, thereby increasing the 
difficulty of successfully combating irregular forces.  An 
initial analysis of curricula in the U.S. Army’s Officer 
and Noncommissioned Officer educational system reveals a 
lack of training in cultural awareness, as well as a lack 
of instruction in irregular warfare.  As a result, a 
deficit exists in our Army education system, resulting in 
our modern day Soldier-turned-warrior-diplomat being unable 
to read a foreign country’s “social landscape”, preventing 
him from properly combating irregular forces.  We define 
the term “social landscape” as the social structure and 
culture in a foreign country.   
Understanding the “social landscape” will only be able 
to be achieved through direct interaction with the local 
population.  Additionally, this direct interaction with the 
local population, if combined with an understanding of the 
cultural and social aspects of the situation, can increase 
the trust between the military and the foreign population.  
One of the most effective ways to increase the 
effectiveness of the U.S. military’s operations overseas is 
to be able to increase the trust of the civilian population 
towards the Army.        
To write this thesis, we focused on analyzing the 
current professional education system to determine how much 
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time is devoted to the study of irregular warfare and 
cultural understanding.  We traced how U.S. Army officer 
and enlisted professional education policy is formulated 
and how schools determine their focus and learning 
objectives.  We also examined various current curricula, 
reviewing both the conventional Officer and NCO school 
house training.  Additionally, we reviewed the U.S. Army’s 
current capstone training events, which are conducted at 
the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training 
Center (NTC/JRTC), and are recognized as the premier method 
of evaluating a unit’s combat readiness. 
Next, we compared our findings about the educational 
curricula to front-line reports and identified the sources 
of shortcomings in our Army education and training.  The 
gaps we identified can be filled, however, and so we 
propose a solution for helping to transform the American 
Soldier to enable him to more effectively negotiate a 
foreign country’s social landscape and successfully combat 
irregular forces. 
Throughout this thesis, we discuss two identified 
deficiencies in education and training – cultural awareness 
and irregular warfare.  These two subject areas, although 
very different on the surface, become very intertwined 
during combat operations in low to mid-intensity 
situations, such as the two U.S. Army Soldiers currently 
find themselves in in Iraq and Afghanistan.  We believe 
that the typical separation between these two subjects and 
the lack of understanding about how they are interrelated 
is one of the main causes for the difficulties the U.S. 
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II. THE FORMULATION OF MILITARY EDUCATION 
Knowing others is intelligence; knowing yourself 
is true wisdom. Mastering others is strength; 
mastering yourself is true power. 
---Lao-Tzu 
 
In a memorandum dated October 8, 2004, entitled 
“SUBJECT: Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from 
Hostilities,” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
appointed the Under Secretary of Policy to be the focal 
point for implementing the 2004 Defense Science Board’s 
recommendations.  The Under Secretary of Policy was 
directed to reshape the military’s capabilities to exploit 
prewar opportunities and address postwar responsibilities 
to achieve U.S. objectives in the transition to and from 
hostilities.  In turn, the draft DoD Directive 9-17-2004 
specifically charges the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness to: 
5.3.2. Reform curricula at senior service 
schools, service academies, ROTC programs, 
advanced officer and enlisted education programs 
to include foreign language education and 
regional area of expertise, in coordination with 
the Secretaries of the Military Departments and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
5.3.3. Expand opportunities for officer, 
enlisted, and civilian personnel to participate 
in regional and cultural education programs, 
including resident or on-line studies and 
exchange programs.  Establish programs to 
maintain proficiency in regional and cultural 




The DoD directive further states that foreign language 
skills and regional and cultural expertise are essential 
enabling capabilities. Furthermore, U.S. forces must be 
reshaped to be capable of operating in a range of cultures 
and languages to respond to an adaptive enemy (DoD 
Directive, 2004, p. 8). 
Within DoD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
as defined by law, is responsible for formulating policies 
for coordinating military education and training of the 
armed forces in regard to military education (CJCSI 
1800.01B, 2004, p. 2).  Each service operates its own 
officer and noncommissioned officer professional military 
education (PME) “to develop leaders with expertise and 
knowledge appropriate to their grade, branch, and 
specialty” (p. A-1).  Although the CJCS Instruction 
1800.01B and 1805.01 distinguishes between education and 
training by stating “at its highest levels and in its 
purest form, education fosters breadth of view, diverse 
perspectives and critical analysis, abstract reasoning, 
comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty and innovative 
thinking, particularly with respect to complex, non-linear 
problems.  This contrasts with training, which focuses on 
the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to 
perform specific functions and tasks” (p. A-2), the 
Instruction also acknowledges the interrelated nature of 
the two elements.  The Instruction continues by stating 
“training and education are not mutually exclusive.  
Virtually all military schools and professional development 
programs include elements of both education and training in 
their academic programs.  Achieving success across the 
joint learning continuum relies on close coordination of 
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training and education to develop synergies as personnel 
develop individually over time”(pg A-2).  The CJCS 
Instruction 1800.01B provides the framework for the officer 
military education policy.  Likewise, CJCS Instruction 
1805.01 provides the framework for the enlisted 
professional military education policy.  These documents 
provide the guidance, establish the learning area 
framework, and delineate what the schools should include in 
their curricula.  Each Service Chief then decides how best 
to address these learning areas with regard to his 
particular service and determines his respective Service’s 
focus (Roesner, 2005). 
Of note, the CJCS Instruction for Enlisted PME states 
that 
Leadership development consists of leadership 
education and training that develops skilled and 
knowledgeable leaders capable of meeting the 
increasingly complex requirements of joint 
operations.  To meet these requirements, 
personnel must expand their understanding of 
individual, Service and joint core competencies 
while broadening their understanding of the 
uncertain strategic and operational environments 
(CJCS Instruction 1805.01, 2004, p. A-3).   
    
Additionally, both the officer and enlisted CJCS 
Instruction documents mandate that school curricula must 
educate across all levels of war (CJCSI 1800.01B, 2004, p. 
A-A-2, & CJCSI 1805.01, 2004, p. A-A-2). 
The CJCSI for enlisted personnel also states that its 
overarching goal is to educate and train the right person 
for the right task at the right time.  “This is especially 
true today because we are discovering the War on Terrorism 
requires noncommissioned officers from all Services to work 
8 
in the joint environment more often than they have before”  
(2004, p. 1).   
Unfortunately for both the officer and enlisted PME, 
the definition of joint is working with another service on 
a staff, within an organization, during training, and/or in 
performance of duties (CJCSI 1805.01, 2004, pp. GL-3, GL-4, 
& CJCSI 1800.01B, 2004, p. GL-5).  We would submit that 
jointness should likewise come to mean working within 
coalitions, foreign militaries, and by, with, and through 
indigenous populations.   
Attached annexes to this thesis list both the officer 
and enlisted PME path through junior, mid-, to senior 
ranks, as well as respective educational opportunities at 
the tactical, operational, and strategic levels for each 













III. ROADBLOCKS AND FINDING DETOURS  
Neither a wise nor a brave man lies down on the 
tracks of history to wait for the train of the 
future to run over him. 
---Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Unfortunately, the DoD directive to reform service 
schools has only slowly been implemented.  A review of Army 
enlisted and officer PME school curricula shows very little 
to almost no inclusion of cultural anthropology/awareness, 
foreign languages, and/or understanding of insurgencies 
(Harp,ND).  Training and Doctrine Command is proposing to 
inject cultural training into every education level; 
however, little to no progress has been made. 
First, there are no set definitions or directed 
learning objectives that the schools must adhere to.  For 
example, many of the schools define “cultural awareness” 
differently and, although some schools claim that they do 
already teach cultural awareness, this is non-regulated and 
for the most part simply a means to check a block.  Second, 
in the near-term, very few if any schools plan to implement 
any of the mentioned reforms, citing that something else in 
the school’s program would have to be cut in order to make 
room for a new course or courses.  Change, if any takes 
place, will definitely need a long-term focus (Protosevich, 
2005).  In addition, for the enlisted ranks, NCOs might not 
even receive education in cultural awareness, foreign 
languages, regional expertise, and/or insurgencies until 
they attend the Sergeant Major Academy near the end of 
their careers-if they stay in the force that long and are 
selected to attend (Carter, 2005). 
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Yet, in this new era of media saturation and 
instantaneous communications, the age of globalization and 
the War on Terror, where everything transpires in front of 
a CNN camera or is recorded in a reporter’s journal, it is 
the junior specialist and lieutenant on the ground with a 
rifle who truly matter.  These are the individuals required 
to rapidly determine friend from foe, make sense out of a 
complex tribal culture, and make on-the-spot decisions that 
can have far-flung implications, not just for tactics and 
operations, but on strategy and policies as well.  It only 
seems prudent that the Army’s PME should be readjusted at 
the junior levels especially, but across all ranks to 
reflect these realities. 
In the fight to improve the Army’s PME, America must 
first tear down the cultural walls within her own 
governmental, civilian, and military bureaucratic 
organizations.  One way to view the attempt to reform the 
Army’s PME is by looking through the lenses of the rational 
actor, organizational behavior, and governmental politics 
models.  These models make clear the extent to which 
individuals and organizations have to be viewed in 
competition, pulling, and interacting with each other for 
their own personal benefits (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 
13-389).  A school’s product-its graduates-is hard to 
measure and returns are not immediate, but take years and 
sometimes decades to tabulate.  With little or no means to 
readily show their near-term worth, sadly, many schools are 
unwilling to share information and ideas about their 
curricula.  From a rational actor’s perspective, no school 
wants to disclose its courses and materials for fear that 
another school will advocate that it can teach the same 
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material to the same or a higher standard and may be even 
for less cost.  Likewise, schools and department heads also 
fear that if they cannot continually prove their relevance, 
their programs may be curtailed or eradicated, funds cut, 
and jobs lost.  Therefore, schools with pertinent curricula 
that could help to shape a more beneficial Army PME neglect 
to do so in order to protect themselves and their own 
organization.  Likewise, schools with poor curricula that 
teach little or nothing about cultural 
anthropology/awareness, insurgencies, regional expertise, 
and/or foreign languages also seek not to divulge 
information in order to protect their organization.  These 
schools do not wish to be found wanting, resulting in 
program cuts, lost jobs, and maybe even closure.  However, 
what should be understood is that PME is not a zero-sum 
game.  There are work-arounds from which everyone could 
benefit, most importantly the Soldier on the ground and, 
hence, the nation. 
As just one example of a work-around amongst a myriad 
of potential educational cooperative opportunities, the 
Army recently announced full implementation of the Basic 
Officer Leadership Course in July 2006 for all second 
lieutenants.  According to General Kevin P. Byrnes, 
TRADOC’s Commanding General, 
Leader development—while educating them to think 
broadly—must prepare them for the complexities on 
the battlefields they’ll see when they join their 
first units.  We’re fighting a small-unit war.  
It’s being fought by staff sergeants, sergeants 
first class, lieutenants, and captains every day.  
They’re the ones out on patrol; they’re the ones 
who are in this extremely complex environment 
where things change from the minute they leave 
their compound until they return that evening.  
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We’ve got to make sure our leaders are prepared 
for those complexities and changes and have a 
framework to refer to, a handrail to grab on to, 
and an understanding of foundational concepts 
(U.S. Army News Release, 2005).   
BOLC consists of three phases.  Phase I is the pre-
commissioning phase where training takes place at the U.S. 
Military Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and 
Officer Candidate Schools.  Herein lays opportunity.  Make 
it mandatory as part of the commissioning requirement that 
cadets/officers take a class on cultural anthropology.  
Require them to study two semesters of a foreign language.  
Provide incentives for them to gain some regional 
familiarity. And offer a class on guerrilla warfare if one 
is not already a part of the curriculum.  While it is true 
that not all universities or OCS posts may have instructors 
available to meet these goals, such blocks of instruction 
can be made available in the virtual world through distance 
learning, on-line courses, or even via contact teams.   
During BOLC Phase II, new lieutenants are put through 
an initial-entry field-leadership phase.  Eighty percent of 
this six-week long course is taught in the field, designed 
to stress small unit leadership and challenge officers 
physically and mentally.  Here is where another opportunity 
exists to inject cultural awareness situations into the 
small unit field training exercises.  In addition, the 
local populace dealt with should not speak English, instead 
forcing students to deal with them through an interpreter 
or use a secondary language they had previously studied in 
BOLC I.  The background for several of these exercises 
could easily draw from actual region-specific settings, not 
just the Middle East. 
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Instruction and scenarios should be as realistic as 
possible and should borrow from Soldiers’ recent 
experiences, encounters and engagements in scenarios of 
modern day nation-states and developing third world 
countries and with non-state actors.  Infusing actual 
information not only reflects real-world teachings, but 
helps educate Soldiers as well as providing realism to the 
exercise; no one cares about the fictitious island of 
Cortina, but everyone will want to learn about the FARC in 
Colombia or Chechen tactics in Afghanistan.  Current 
intelligence and maps should be used to help build these 
realistic scenarios.  Equally important, students should be 
encouraged to learn to work by, with, and through the 
population when confronting insurgents.   
BOLC III, the branch technical phase, is where 
lieutenants learn the specialized skills, doctrine, 
tactics, and techniques of their assigned branch (U.S. Army 
News Release, 2005).  BOLC Phase III can further capitalize 
on the same educational and training enhancers described 
above, but with yet more branch-related specificity.   
On a parallel note, while BOLC represents the first 
building block in the foundation of officer education and 
training, the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) 
is the first level of development in the formation of our 
Noncommissioned Officers.  PLDC is a month-long leadership 
course for Army Specialists and Corporals designed to teach 
them the skills necessary to effectively lead small groups 
of soldiers at the team, squad, and section levels.  The 
first leadership course designed to transform enlisted 
soldiers into NCOs, PLDC seeks to “instill self discipline, 
professional ethics, and establish the foundation for 
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further training and leader development” (EUSA Wightman NCO 
Academy, 2005).  The course’s topics include:  leadership, 
training management, map reading, land navigation and drill 
and ceremony, and it culminates in a field training 
exercise (FTX).  The purpose of the capstone FTX is to 
evaluate the student’s performance in a stressful situation 
and ability to lead a patrol in a combat scenario (Ruiz, 
2005).   
A review of various PLDC training schedules reveals 
what amounts to four phases of enhancing Soldiers’ 
knowledge:  1) leadership to know oneself and how to lead 
others; 2) to know the importance of physical training and 
drill and ceremony which are integral to leadership but 
also represent Army customs; 3) to know and be able to read 
terrain via map reading and land navigation; and 4) to 
understand how to put these practices together in the 
culminating FTX (Hawaii Army National Guard, 2005).  
However, while we are taking the time to educate and train 
to see ourselves, see the terrain, and see a conventional 
foe, we must also be able to effectively understand and 
operate in a non-western environment, deal with a foreign 
culture, and appreciate that our actions may either incite 
or help curb a rise in guerrilla warfare.  The leadership 
phase itself should not only concentrate on leading U.S. 
Soldiers but also discuss leadership behavior in foreign 
environments where the indigenous population will 
scrutinize every move the leader makes.  Given today’s 
information age, our Soldiers have to understand that good 
or bad impressions can have lasting and far flung results, 
potentially of strategic impact.   
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As with BOLC, here is another opportunity to educate 
and train rising leaders about the need to understand the 
social landscape by weaving aspects of foreign cultures and 
irregular warfare into the FTX.  Furthermore, such 
teachings can be introduced without adding any more time to 
the 30-day course. 
The FTX presents an excellent opportunity to immerse 
junior leaders in a difficult and demanding situation.  
While basic tactics, techniques, and procedures should 
still be practiced, we must raise the bar in training to 
expose our junior leaders to the kinds of worst case 
scenarios that they may find themselves confronting.  For 
example, the FTX should also include civilians on the 
battlefield from a non-western environment who don’t speak 
English, a foe who blends into the local populace as well 
as into any conventional indigenous forces, and an 
inquisitive embedded reporter trying to get a story.  
Scenarios should be derived from real-life experiences 
learned from Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq 
to name a few.  The Center for Army Lessons Learned, 
numerous unit After Action Reviews, and combat veterans 
provide a wealth of information which can be used to design 
such a challenging and rewarding FTX.  Better to stress our 
leaders to the utmost in training, then leave them to fail 
in war.      
Similarly, all Army schools can revamp their education 
and training to better peg them to individuals’ particular 
level of expertise.  Bolstering current doctrine and new 
TTPs would not require new courses. Instead, actual 
information and intelligence about present-day hot spots 
could be used to create relevant, modern day scenarios, 
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especially when so many soldiers and officers find 
themselves deployed right after PLDC or BOLC II.  
In addition to fostering these work-arounds in the 
school houses, training scenarios at a unit’s capstone 
training exercise – while at JRTC or NTC – can likewise be 
made much more worthwhile.  For example, a unit rotating to 
NTC could be learning about the North Korean Peoples’ Army 
or Chinese Army instead of studying the fictitious OPFOR.  
Also, not only should the rotation focus on high to mid-
intensity conflict for the first week to ten days, but then 
the rotation should shift to low intensity conflict and 
post-conflict stability operations.  Relevant areas to 
cover include dealing with irregular warfare and the 
establishment of security, governance, economic well-being, 
and justice and reconciliation.  Or, being more realistic 
still, it should be possible to create an even more 
advanced situation where the unit needs to cope with a mix 
of all of the above situations simultaneously.  This will 
go far in disabusing notions that these types of conflict 
arrive in a set sequence or order. 
Likewise, JRTC should do away with its make-believe 
Cortinian scenario and instead shift focus to a likely hot 
spot in the world.  Low-intensity conflict and post-
conflict stability operations should also be emphasized.  
Real world villages often do not have a JRTC-type major or 
chieftain in charge, and Soldiers must learn how to operate 
in acephalous societies.  Real world scenarios could be 
changed yearly and could shift between scenarios drawing 
from a range of locations, such as Bosnia, Somalia, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Colombia, etc.  We 
recognize there are political or diplomatic reasons that a 
17 
make-believe scenario and enemy is utilized, in order to 
prevent labeling any specific country as an “enemy,” but we 
believe there needs to be an understanding of possible 
real-world threats incorporated into the training, in order 
to get the most out of it.  A unit rotating through these 
real world situations would gain a far greater training 
advantage and would not only be able to apply, but would 
have an understanding of, regional areas, knowledge of 
cultural aspects, differing languages, and guerrilla 
warfare TTPs.  All of this would render these exercises 
more realistic. 
We are not advocating doing away with conventional 
teaching and training.  On the contrary, we believe in 
balancing the Army’s PME and training so that the Soldier 
is still able to soundly defeat conventional armies, in 
conventional settings. But, his education has to be 
counter-balanced so that he is adequately prepared to work 
with indigenous populations and defeat guerrillas and 
terrorists too, whether in remote areas of a country or 
within its urban centers.  As the CJCSI states, the Army 
must prepare its Soldiers for warfare across the entire 
spectrum of conflict (emphasis added).  While the Army has 
mastered the high to mid-intensity conflict spectrum, 
recent history demonstrates that the Army is still lacking 




































IV. REPEATING AND RELEARNING HISTORY 
The significant problems we face cannot be solved 
at the same level of thinking we were at when we 
created them. 
--- Albert Einstein 
 
Coupled with failing to consider regional and 
historical factors, the U.S. military’s best intended but 
completely misguided actions in an insurgency can 
exponentially increase the number of its enemies, quickly 
alienate and/or diminish its friends and supporters in the 
population, and destroy a level of trust that is paramount 
in the real battle for, as we’ve seen in Iraq, the people’s 
“hearts and minds.”   
Christopher Varhola, a U.S. Army Major and cultural 
anthropologist, recently addressed these cancerous issues 
plaguing the American military in Iraq in an article for 
the Foreign Policy Research Institute.  In his piece, 
“American Challenges in Post-Conflict Iraq”, Varhola argues 
that, at the very least, the Army should incorporate an 
understanding of guerrilla warfare and cultural awareness 
into its military education system in order to better 
prepare Soldiers and leaders—warrior diplomats for reading 
the “social landscape” in low intensity conflicts in order 
to save lives and nations.  
Chris Varhola’s main points are that the American 
military’s lack of training and experience in the Middle 
East leads to U.S. practices that alienate broad elements 
of the Iraqi population, and we are failing to take into 
account historical and regional factors.  Even after recent 
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peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, Haiti, and Somalia, 
Varhola argues that the U.S. military was unprepared for 
governing an Islamic nation.  With its focus on combat 
operations, the U.S. military excluded an understanding of 
indigenous power structures and cultural considerations.  
Furthermore, the military’s lack of training in both the 
Arabic language and support activities such as local law 
enforcement, administration, and various reconstruction 
activities is evident—all of which should be considered 
paramount in working with a host nation’s population and 
countering an insurgency.  
Hence, as Varhola implies, the military educational 
system has not prepared Soldiers for the unique 
requirements of battling an insurgency and dealing with low 
intensity conflict.  Sadly, we neglected to learn the 
lessons of Vietnam and incorporate them into service 
schools.  Noted author and Executive Director of the Center 
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, retired Lieutenant 
Colonel Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. in his book The Army and 
Vietnam devotes a whole chapter, “The Revolution That 
Failed,” to discussing the U.S. Army’s “tying itself to a 
conventional war in the training of its officers.”  The 
Army’s leadership considered dealing with insurgency to be 
a “fad”, stone-walled President Kennedy’s efforts to 
incorporate counter-insurgency training at all educational 
levels, from West Point all the way through the War College 
and, instead, continued to focus on big-unit operations 
(battalion and above) as opposed to small-unit, 
counterinsurgency operations.(Krepinevich, 1986, pp. 27-55)  
Ironically, a current review of the Army’s military 
educational system finds that not much has changed since 
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the 1960s.  In all of the Army’s military educational 
curricula, the focus remains on large scale conventional 
war with very little to no attention paid to preparing our 
Soldiers for dealing with the complexities of an 
insurgency.  This has to be considered a major underlying 
reason for why we are having so many problems overseas 
today.(Harp, ND) 
In support of Varhola’s view, parallel reasoning is 
found not only in Krepinevich’s book but also in Backfire, 
a book authored by Loren Baritz, also about Vietnam.  In 
it, Baritz blames the quagmire in Vietnam on both the myths 
of American culture and the way we cultivated and educated 
warriors.  As Baritz puts it for Vietnam, the U.S. Army 
fought a conventional war whose aim was killing, whereas 
“The key to the problem was the farmer and his family.” 
(1998, pp. 233&251)  For Iraq today Varhola echoes, 
“targeting insurgents takes precedence over working with 
the people.”  The U.S. military is still not geared toward 
civil-military operations.  For instance, as a U.S. Army 
Brigade Commander in Iraq told Varhola, his forces were 
there to “kill the enemy, not win their hearts and minds.”   
Lending further support to Varhola’s assertions, a 
recent unclassified e-mail article written by the First 
Marine Division Intelligence Officer, Major Ben Connable, 
astutely cites the various difficulties U.S. Marines are 
having in understanding the Iraqi people and vice-versa, 
for “American Marines and Iraqis are hardwired at far ends 
of a cultural void not by genetics but by social 
conditioning” and these fundamental differences lead to 
fundamental misunderstandings.(Connable, May 30, 2004)   
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Reflecting their education, training, and culture, 
American Soldiers regularly assert that the only thing 
Iraqis understand is “force.”  But, while it may be true 
that force is universally understood, force can also foster 
a reaction that undermines the Coalition’s goals.  Varhola 
cites numerous examples of the U.S. military’s forceful 
practices that have served to alienate the Iraqi population 
and undoubtedly turned some “fence sitters” into 
insurgents.  Here are a few examples of what the Army has 
not considered: 
• The long term effects of test firing weapons from 
moving vehicles in urban areas. 
• The ramifications of completely destroying walls 
that have anti-American graffiti painted on them 
versus just repainting them. 
• Detaining all the males in a given area for weeks 
or months on end without regard to legitimacy. 
• Detaining family members of suspects in the hopes 
that the suspects will turn themselves in. 
• Using dogs, which Iraqis consider unclean 
animals, to search Iraqi homes, even though this 
is viewed as a disgrace by Arabs and as an attack 
upon their honor. 
• American male Soldiers searching Iraqi females—a 
highly disrespectful action that violates a 
family’s honor and begs vengeance by the male 
family members. 
• Arrests of religious leaders who preach against 
the Coalition.  We should view such public 
speeches less as a cause and more as an 
effect/symptom of public discontent to be 
monitored carefully.  Unwarranted arrest of 
religious leaders for what they say just leads 
Iraqis to believe Americans really do not believe 
in freedom of speech. 
• Misunderstanding the terms “liberation” and 
“occupation” and how they have different and 
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detrimental meanings politically, morally, and 
legally to the Iraqi people. 
• Creating more enemies or at least hardening them 
when American Soldiers place their boots on the 
heads of Iraqi captives, for Arabs consider such 
acts as inhumane and disgraceful.  Soldiers must 
come to understand the values of honor, shame, 
and dignity in Arab social systems. 
• Soldiers misconstruing the nature of how blood 
feuds intertwine with local customs-one reason 
why so many baseless erroneous tips are given to 
U.S. Soldiers.  
Given how quickly Soldiers are expected to transition 
from open combat to peacekeeping/occupation duties, Varhola 
reiterates the importance of Soldiers’ training taking 
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V. READING THE “SOCIAL LANDSCAPE” 
What we actually learn, from any given set of 
circumstances, determines whether we become 
increasingly powerless or more powerful.  
---Blaine Lee 
 
The current deficit in cultural awareness and 
understanding insurgency results in the erosion of trust 
between the American Soldier and indigenous populations.  
This leads to difficulties while conducting military 
operations.  The U.S. military is currently engaged in 
combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, two environments 
that do not present conventional battlefields.  There is no 
clearly defined enemy or a “front line” that can be 
identified, measured, and mapped.  The current battlefields 
are asymmetric and contain multiple areas that require 
different tactics, techniques, and procedures based on 
constantly changing situations.  American Soldiers are 
required to conduct numerous types of operations that run 
the gamut from humanitarian assistance in areas with the 
full support and cooperation of the local population 
through combat patrols in a decidedly anti-American hostile 
environment.  Although both of these mission sets at each 
extreme of the warfare spectrum present their own unique 
difficulties and challenges, the multiple mission sets that 
are in the middle are probably the most difficult to 
accomplish.  In these the Soldier is entering into an 
unknown situation where portions of the population might be 
willing to support U.S. goals and objectives, while other 
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segments throw in their lot with the opposition, for 
individual or ideological reasons. 
In these unknown situations, it is extremely important 
for force protection of the Soldiers, as well as the 
success of the operations, that Soldiers understand the 
local situation.  Understanding the local situation implies 
an understanding of the local culture, including the mores 
and beliefs of the people as well as understanding the 
social structure of the society, and how individuals 
interact with each other and with external actors.  
Currently, U.S. Soldiers are unable to read the “social 
landscape”. 
Understanding the social landscape allows Soldiers to 
more effectively define their operational environment, 
thereby allowing for a proper analysis and application of 
tactics, techniques and procedures.  Additionally, 
understanding the operational environment helps to prevent 
potential costly mistakes based on improper cultural 
awareness.   
In conventional military battles, we are all taught 
that to be successful, a military unit needs to fully 
understand and utilize information about three items.  We 
are taught that the keys to success are to “know yourself, 
know the enemy, and know the terrain”.  The conventional 
military, fighting a battle against a conventional threat, 
needs to fully comprehend the capabilities and tactics, 
techniques, and procedures of both the enemy forces in the 
battlespace, as well as friendly units that can affect the 
outcome of any given battle.  In addition to the study of 
the military forces present, the Soldier should be as 
familiar as possible with all facets of the terrain where 
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the battle will take place.  The U.S. Army Soldier is 
taught to “read” the terrain and the enemy, and understand 
how they interrelate, as well as with the Soldier’s unit. 
 
Figure 1.   READING the BATTLESPACE. 
 
The problem that arises in an insurgency, or a low-
intensity conflict, is that there is another factor 
involved that also needs to be “known” and understood – the 
indigenous population.  In a battle against non-state 
forces, or against insurgents, the interrelated and 
interactive contact between the military forces on the 
battlefield, both U.S. and enemy, with the indigenous 
population can not be ignored, and requires a military 
force that is taught to “read” the “social landscape” and 
not just the physical terrain, or the actions of the enemy. 
This understanding of the interaction between the military 
and the indigenous population is summarized by Cecil B. 
Curry in the introduction to Landsdale’s book titled In the 
Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia.  
Curry states, "Before beginning any course of action, 
leaders always needed to ask themselves first:  "What will 
the people's reaction [be] to this proposed action?"  






Figure 2.   READING the “SOCIAL LANDSCAPE”. 
 
Major General (Ret) Robert Scales argues that some of 
the problems the U.S. military is facing in places like 
Iraq and Afghanistan are the result of an over-reliance on 
technology, combined with a lack of cultural understanding 
of the local population.  According to Scales, “We need to 
be able to understand the non-military advantage, to read 
intentions, to build trust, to convert opinions, to manage 
perceptions – all tasks that demand an exceptional ability 
to understand people, their culture and their 
motivation.”(Hedges, 2004)  
The U.S. military usually receives little instruction 
as to the nuances of the local culture prior to deployment.  
Although some information is provided, it usually consists 
of basic statements, in bulletized form, such as “avoid 
showing the bottom of your foot in mid-eastern countries”, 
or “don’t stare at women”, and listing hand gestures that 
are considered taboo.  Although these small, succinct 






information and can be useful for Soldiers that are 
traveling through a foreign country or region, they only 
provide superficial sensitivization, and their only real 
aim is to help soldiers avoid offending the population.   
In practice, it is difficult to translate such 
warnings into effective cross-cultural understanding 
especially while conducting military operations for an 
extended period of time in varied combat conditions.  An 
example of the difficulties faced when trying to translate 
cultural awareness statements into proper application of 
tactics in an operation is when Soldiers in Iraq were using 
dogs to help search houses.  Although Soldiers might 
realize that the Iraqis didn’t “like” dogs, what they might 
not realize is that the vast majority of Iraqis don’t just 
“not like” dogs, but instead consider them an “unclean” 
animal and bringing them into houses was considered 
disgraceful.  Another example of tactical difficulties 
based on a misunderstanding of culture is when American 
male Soldiers search Iraqi women.  Although tactically it 
might be necessary, it is considered a highly disrespectful 
action that violates the honor of a family and begs 
vengeance.  These two examples, as previously mentioned, 
indicate just some of the problems that can lead to further 
alienation of the population, and an additional erosion of 
trust.  It is very difficult to trust someone, let alone an 
organization, that violated your family’s honor or 
disgraced your home.  As a result, our actions are eroding 
the trust of the Iraqi people in the Coalition. 
Many issues relating to trust arise when the military 
interacts with local populations.  Members of the local 
population help determine whether the military is viewed as 
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a liberating or occupying force.  They are directly 
affected by what the military accomplishes, or fails to 
accomplish.  Additionally, confidence in the military can 
greatly assist in carrying out orders, and establishing a 
secure, stable environment. 
Piotr Sztompka, in his book Trust: A Sociological 
Theory, indicates that there are three bases for the 
trustworthiness of an individual or organization: 
reputation, performance, and appearance (1999). Of these 
three, two of them – reputation and performance – are most 
likely to be affected by misunderstanding cultural norms in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Appearance is also a factor, but as 
the majority of our military are in uniform and carry 
weapons, they are automatically lumped together as 
belonging to one organization – the American Military.  
Distinguishing one unit from another is very difficult for 
military members to do, let alone the local population.  
Although there are some things military members can do, 
such as not wear sunglasses when confronting locals in 
order to display a less threatening posture, force 
protection issues often dictate our general overall 
appearance.  Additionally, the local population probably 
does not base its sense of trust or mistrust on appearance, 
but on past and present actions. 
The military’s reputation greatly depends on its past 
performance.  Many of the mistakes that have been made in 
Iraq, that are the consequence of cross-cultural 
misunderstanding have decreased trust in the military and 
have set a precedent for mistrust based on reputation. 
Robert Galford and Anne Seibold Drapeau discuss some of the 
problems major organizations have when it comes to the 
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issue of trust in their Harvard Business Review (HBR) 
article, “The Enemies of Trust”.  Galford and Drapeau list 
seven “enemies of trust”.  One of them – “rumors in a 
vacuum” – can lead to the spread of information loosely 
based on incidents involving the military’s interaction 
with locals that is detrimental to the military’s goals and 
objectives.(Galford & Drapeau, 2003) Sadly, the Infantry 
squad’s Company Commander whose actions were mentioned at 
the beginning of this thesis said of the incident involving 
Haroun, “…they [the Iraqis] don’t have all the 
facts.”(Peterson, 2003)  Without informing the local 
population as to the “facts”, rumors will start and lead to 
mistrust throughout the community.   
As Sztompka discusses, current performance also 
affects trust.  Recently, some changes in arrest techniques 
have been implemented by some units with an understanding 
that insulting or humiliating locals while placing them 
under arrest might do more harm then good.  According to 
U.S. Army Major General Peter Chiarelli, Commander of the 
1st Cavalry Division currently stationed in Baghdad, “The 
worst thing in the world is to put him on the ground and 
put your boot on his head.  Honor is so critical in this 
society.  You don’t take away a man’s honor.”(Associated 
Press, September 4, 2004) Although some changes are being 
undertaken in some units, the argument can be made that too 
much damage has already been done.  As Sztompka notes, 
“[performance] is of course, a much less reliable clue than 
reputation, because it does not allow for a judgment as to 
whether trustworthy performance is continuous, typical, and 
in character”.(1999, p. 27) Unfortunately, it might take a 
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longer time for trustworthy current and future behavior to 
overcome the mistrust that already exists in Iraq.   
Where the U.S. military is combating insurgents, such 
as in Iraq and Afghanistan, which means also dealing 
directly with a local indigenous population, trust between 
the locals and the military is paramount while a reputation 
of untrustworthiness cannot only harm the U.S. forces, but 
has the potential to help the insurgents.   Chiarelli sums 
it up his way: “You’ve got to see it from a force 
protection standpoint: you’re making more enemies.  When we 
mistreat one person, I’ve got a net increase of nine 
enemies.”(Associated Press, 2004) In an article entitled 
“The Tipping Point: How Military Operations Go Sour”, Neil 
Swidey writes, “In nearly every occupation, there is a 
tipping point-a defining incident that crystallizes the 
popular reception of the occupier. Right now, the views of 
many Iraqis toward the US occupation force are extremely 
fluid, changing depending on the circumstances of the day-
or hour.”(2003)   
Understanding the underlying social conditions, being 
aware of the cultural situation, having solid information 
concerning the population’s moods and beliefs, as well as 
understanding the networks that connect the different parts 
of a society comprise one way to avoid a “tipping point.” 
(Swidey, 2003) 
Part of successful military operations, especially in 
an indeterminate environment, consists in “getting the word 
out.”  This entails providing information to the local 
population in order to affect behavior, as well as to make 
clear the military’s goals and objectives.  Essential to 
spreading the message is understanding how ideas are 
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transmitted and appreciating the social factors and 
internal relationships that exist at the local level.  One 
way to look at and analyze the connections in a given area, 
such as a village, town, or province, is to attempt to 
conduct a network analysis of the area.  This would consist 
of mapping the main players or personalities within a town 
and attempting to pictorially or graphically reproduce the 
social connections in the area, in order to identify the 
main “hubs” or “connectors” within various segments of the 
population.  For instance, one could start by concentrating 
on the family ties between households, and then expand to 
consider social and financial interactions.  By building a 
complete picture of the relationships and interactions 
within a community, it should be possible to figure out the 
key players and personalities who could be targeted either 
with a message or with requests for information that could 
lead to a more effective utilization of forces.  They might 
also be very helpful in conveying specific mission 
objectives and goals back to the community. 
The main drawbacks to this procedure are the amount of 
time, analysis, and information that are required to come 
up with a realistic and effective schematic of 
interactions.  To do this effectively would take a 
persistent presence and significant manpower and could 
prove extremely difficult to maintain, especially given the 
size of current operational areas within Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  The mapping or understanding of interactions 
becomes even more important when dealing with an acephalous 
society, where there are no key leaders, which appears to 
be the current situation in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq 
(especially after the Ba’ath Party members’ total removal 
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from power and the political system).  An alternate way to 
target key personalities within an area is to simply focus 
on the people who are socially active, or attempt to find 
those who are most likely to be trusted by other members of 
the local population.   
In The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big 
Difference, Malcom Gladwell provides a very useful theory 
on the spread of ideas and selling of products.  His three 
agents of change – the Law of the Few, the Stickiness 
Factor, and the Power of Context – can carry an idea or a 
product up to and beyond the “tipping point”, after which 
its spread grows exponentially (Gladwell, 2000). Two of 
these – the Stickiness Factor and the Power of Context – 
can be utilized at higher operational levels, especially in 
the arenas of selecting and broadcasting the messages that 
the strategic planners deem most important.  Meanwhile, The 
Law of the Few, can be applied at the tactical level when 
it comes to identifying who these “few” are, thereby 
facilitating more effective interaction between the U.S. 
military and the local population.  This increase in 
effectiveness can assist the military in the dissemination 
of ideas and information, which is always extremely 
important when conducting operations in an environment 
containing insurgents.   
When it comes to Gladwell’s agents of change, he 
identifies three types of personality.  With the proper 
combination of these individuals, he argues an idea can 
spread like wildfire.  These three are: Connectors, Mavens, 
and Salesmen.  The Connectors are people who interact 
socially with many different people from many different 
walks of life. These are the people that might be 
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considered “social butterflies.”  They are the people that 
seem to know everyone in a given society.  The Mavens are 
the collectors of information, but as Gladwell points out, 
they are not passive collectors.  They are socially 
motivated to spread the information and knowledge they 
acquire.  Salesmen, in contrast, are individuals who are 
able to pass a message on through eloquence and empathy.  
In other words, Salesmen can latch onto an idea, and if 
they agree with it, can convince others of its merit.  As 
Gladwell comments, “In a social epidemic, Mavens are data 
banks.  They provide the message.  Connectors are social 
glue: they spread it.  But there is also a select group of 
people—Salesmen—with the skills to persuade us when we are 
unconvinced of what we are hearing, and they are as 
critical to the tipping of word of mouth epidemics as the 
other two groups.”(Gladwell, 2000, p. 70)   
Although discovery of these specific individuals will 
be difficult, especially in an area that is anti-American, 
investing in the quest is worth the manpower.  In some 
cases, basic inquiries of the local populace, such as ‘who 
do you tell if there is a problem in your neighborhood?’ 
‘Who do you go to if you need assistance?’ ‘Where do you 
get your information about local events?’ and, ‘who is the 
person who knows the most about the history of your 
neighborhood?’ can lead Soldiers to key personalities.  The 
Army’s ability to identify these individuals and earn their 
trust could help to “tip” the indigenous population over to 
the U.S. or, at a minimum, allow us to more effectively 
focus information operations, whether to push the 
Coalition’s message or to pull of information from the 
local populace.  Gaining the trust of some key individuals 
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might help the military to gain the trust throughout an 
entire area. 
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VI. IMPROVING THE ARMY’S PROFESSIONAL MILITARY 
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM  
Imagination is more important than knowledge. 
Knowledge is limited.  Imagination encircles the 
world. 
--- Albert Einstein 
 
Trained to breach minefields, combat engineers with 
little prior experience with sewer systems or water 
purification improvised as they sat through meetings of 
Baghdad’s water department; specialists in jumping out of 
airplanes, America’s paratroopers with little formal 
knowledge of law enforcement established the Kirkuk police 
department; and, the mechanized spearhead of the invasion, 
who fought all the way into Baghdad, handed out textbooks 
in a Baghdad girls’ school.  While simultaneously fighting 
guerrillas, Army officers do their best to transition from 
combat leaders to city managers often saying as they do so, 
“I’m doing the best I can, but I don’t know how to do this, 
I don’t have a manual.  You got a manual?” (Packer, 2003)  
In the process of transitioning between combat and nation-
building, cultural misunderstandings and a lack of 
understanding about insurgency has added fuel to the fires 
of the Iraqi insurgency along the way.  While the Army has 
some limited peacekeeping experience (e.g. the Balkans and 
Kosovo), the Army has formally taught its Soldiers as much 
about nation-building activities and other cultures as it 
has about insurgencies: next to nothing.   
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The solution lies in what President Kennedy urged 
forty years ago, authors Krepinevich and Baritz wrote about 
in the 1980s, and scholars such as cultural anthropologist 
Christopher Varhola call for today: the U.S. Army must 
teach about irregular warfare and cultural awareness 
throughout its professional military education system 
(PME), at its service and branch schools, and to its units.  
In addition, initial entry recruits at One Station Unit 
Training and at professional development schools for 
Noncommissioned Officers should also include receiving 
education and training on how to combat insurgencies and 
why understanding cultures matters.  At a recent hearing of 
the House Armed Services Committee, retired Major General 
Robert Scales argued,  
This cultural wall must be torn down.  Lives 
depend on it.  Every young Soldier should receive 
extensive cultural and language instruction… The 
success of counterinsurgency operations depends 
much more on the agility of mind than on any 
other single factor, and it’s the absence of this 
agility of mind that I suspect constrains us most 
today in Iraq… (Hedges, 2004)   
 
Irregular warfare needs to be taught throughout the 
officer and NCO professional military education system.  
Each level of instruction should be tailored to the level 
of understanding about insurgencies needed at the Soldier’s 
specific level of responsibility.   
For example, at the officer basic courses and NCO 
primary and basic leadership development courses, 
instruction should be integrated that will trace the 
evolution of American counterinsurgency doctrine in 
America’s small wars from the 1800’s to present.  Valuable 
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lessons can be re-learned from the American Indian Wars, 
the Banana Wars, the Rio Coco Patrol, and El Salvador to 
cite a few examples (Sepp, 2003).  At these officer and NCO 
basic courses, the focus should be on the tactical level, 
for it is the young lieutenants and junior NCOs who will 
combat the insurgents face to face in the field.  Reading 
Mao Tse-Tung’s On Guerrilla Warfare should be mandatory.  
In addition, new or recurrent tactics, techniques, and 
procedures currently used by the insurgents in Iraq and 
Afghanistan should also be taught and discussed in great 
detail. 
At the Captains Career Course (formerly the Officer 
Advanced Course), the First Sergeant Course, and the 
Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course for company grade 
leaders at the captain, master sergeant, and sergeant first 
class levels, a program of instruction covering irregular 
warfare should examine what such struggles have meant in 
operational terms for governments and guerrillas.  There 
should be a focus on how armed, intra-state struggles are 
actually carried out, to include how they begin, evolve, 
and end, and why they succeed or fail.  The case studies of 
Malaya and Vietnam present excellent examples.  The 
interactive nature of the insurgent and counterinsurgent 
campaigns should be especially stressed (McCormick, 2004).  
This level of instruction further builds upon lessons 
taught in the basic courses.  While the basic courses 
mainly focus on tactical level considerations at the team, 
squad, and platoon levels, the mid-career courses should 
build on these previous teachings and incorporate field and 
combat lessons learned, focusing on the tactical aspects of 
the platoon and company, as well as battalion operational 
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considerations, for senior NCO’s and captains will play 
pivotal roles as platoon and company leaders and as 
battalion staff officers.  
For field grade officers at the Command and General 
Staff College and War Colleges and for sergeant majors at 
the Sergeant Majors Academy, material should be assigned 
that will help them to develop an analytical framework by 
which to understand the origins and dynamics of organized 
insurgent conflict.  Special attention should be paid to a 
critical examination of the prevailing theories of social 
rebellion in order to derive a general theory of internal 
war that helps account for the social, political, and 
organizational dimensions of the struggle between political 
movements, non-state actors, and incumbent regimes.  Once 
again, this instruction would build upon previous courses 
and should also incorporate current lessons learned at the 
strategic level (McCormick, 2004). 
Additionally, understanding how to identify local 
social structures would be extremely beneficial to 
understanding conflict from new and different angles.  
Anthropology offers a way to study warfare and large-scale 
ethnic conflict as seen from the perspective of the 
participants and can help us gain an emic and not just and 
etic view.  Most often American Soldiers do not comprehend 
why people in foreign countries behave and react the way 
they do.  Similarly, Americans often fail to take into 
account cultural considerations when planning and executing 
military operations and, as a result, sometimes make more 
enemies than friends.  Cultural awareness is extremely 
beneficial in three ways:  it fosters better international 
relations, provides views from different perspectives, and 
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can greatly assist in knowing one’s enemy.  Consequently, 
understanding other cultures is critical in the development 
of an adequate irregular warfare war plan – whether at the 
tactical, operational, or strategic levels.   
Lieutenants and sergeants at the platoon level must 
know how to operate in and respect people from the various 
cultures that they will encounter on deployments.  Often 
conducting squad and platoon patrols, junior leaders need a 
baseline of understanding about the people(s) with whom 
they are interacting.  Small mistakes can have major 
consequences.  Hence at the officer basic and NCO primary 
and basic leadership development courses, an instructional 
overview should be given on how to understand foreign 
cultures, with a focus on the cultures of potential “hot” 
spots.  At ground level, if a small unit leader understands 
the social structure and inner workings of the local 
society and indigenous population, then he will be more 
likely to establish relations of trust as well as a better 
intelligence picture.  Furthermore, case studies should be 
used to demonstrate how various societies perceive 
different issues. 
Further case studies of various cultures should also 
be addressed at the Captains Career Course, the First 
Sergeant Course, and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer 
Course.  Here, the company leader must realize how his 
actions as a potential military mayor of an area during 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations can have 
dramatic effects and / or unintended consequences if he 
fails to properly read the region’s social landscape.   
Likewise, at the Command and General Staff and War 
Colleges, and at the Sergeant Majors Academy, leaders 
42 
should learn to re-evaluate the salience of ethnic, 
cultural, and civilizational divides.  Students should 
learn how a deeper look into social relations could better 
illuminate the actions of various ethnic groups.  Thus, 
battalion, brigade, and division leaders could gain an 
upper hand in understanding why people engage in warfare 
elsewhere, and the ways current and potential enemies might 
think and act based on their ethnic, culture, and 
civilizational environment (Simons, 2004).  Such knowledge 
could prove quite beneficial especially if competing groups 
can be used against each other.   
In addition to officer and NCO education, recently 
enlisted Soldiers should also receive instruction on 
understanding other cultures.  Examples can be drawn from 
the various differences within America’s own society as 
well as lessons learned from American Soldiers overseas.  
Soldiers could thus be taught that what are completely 
acceptable norms of behavior back home in Athens, Georgia 
may cause extreme discord in Mosul, Iraq.  In the age of 
information warfare especially, one private’s actions in 
front of the camera can now have strategic consequences. 
In addition to school house instruction, “contact 
teams” who have expertise in particular world regions 
should be formed.  These teams would periodically visit 
units to keep them abreast of and current on overseas 
affairs and, more importantly, visit units prior to a 
deployment to conduct cultural awareness training for the 
specific region of deployment.  In addition, the contact 
team should re-visit the unit prior to the unit’s re-
deployment to collect and gather information to strengthen 
the contact team’s knowledge, pass on that information to 
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other units (especially the next unit scheduled to rotate 
in), and share the information with the school houses for 
possible updates to learning objectives and syllabi.  
Currently, Professor Barak Salmoni of the Naval 
Postgraduate School is heading such a program for Marine 
Corps units rotating to and from Iraq. 
The military and its civilian constituents already 
contain more than enough qualified and suitable instructors 
within our ranks who can teach the material and lessons 
learned—many with combat and personal experience in foreign 
lands—such as anthropologists, interpreters who have dealt 
extensively in a foreign culture, expatriates, and 
professors grounded in irregular warfare, such as those 
teaching at the Naval Postgraduate School and the John F. 
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.  In addition, 
many of the Army’s service schools already contain foreign 
officers.  The Army could optimize their attendance by 
requiring foreign officers to be guest lecturers on their 
specific regional areas.  Given the fact that the U.S. 
already supplements the income of foreign officers who 
attend U.S. military schools for a first rate education, 
the Army should also make it mandatory that upon their 
graduation the foreign officer must serve a minimum of two 
years as a liaison officer to a U.S. Army Battalion or 
Brigade, or as a foreign language instructor at a service 
school. 
Retired General Anthony Zinni, former CENTCOM 
Commander, recently proposed something similar in his 
remarks to the Center of Defense Information’s board of 
directors.  Zinni urges seeking the aid of Arab officers 
who have attended our schools, such as our command and 
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general staff colleges, and who not only speak English but 
who also already have a good working relationship with 
Americans.  General Zinni’s argument is: 
I’d put them on the planning staffs of these 
units, as advisors, as planners.  If I’m a 
battalion commander down there in the middle of 
Fallujah or Najaf, I need more than some kid who 
happens to be of Arab descent and speaks Arabic 
that I dragged over there and probably doesn’t 
speak the dialect.  I would like to have five or 
six of these guys that I went to school with, 
that I know, that would be there, that would be 
seconded there for me as planners, advisors, and 
to help me in these situations (2004). 
Furthermore, when it comes to costs, retired Major 
General Scales argues that the military is spending 
billions of dollars on weapons, but just a pittance on 
educating its officers and Soldiers, especially on the 
foreign cultures and languages they encounter in places 
like Iraq and Afghanistan (Hedges, 2003).  Sadly, the 
services have managed to spend billions in research for the 
Navy’s littoral combat ship experiment and $238 million a 
piece for each new F-22 fighter, yet in transforming the 
Army, we’ve forgotten to also transform the Soldier.  
Even if the Army introduces new doctrinal literature, 
such as the new Field Manual-I 3-07, which is being derived 
from the Iraqi insurgency and engagements in the Global War 
on Terror, the task to educate and train officers and their 
men now both in the classroom and the field, remains 
(2004).   
Training is an important element of doctrinal 
development.  Hence, as previously discussed, the Army must 
also revamp its major training centers—the Joint Readiness 
Training Center and the National Training Center, both of 
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which are considered capstone events for a unit to be 
combat ready.  NTC and JRTC should balance their focus of 
combating major conventional forces with combating 
irregular forces.  They should also test Soldiers on their 
post-conflict stability and reconstruction skills, as well 
as how to deal with foreign cultures.  These should be 
included as the measures for success.     
Strong evidence suggests a need to better understand 
insurgencies and foreign cultures given the complex 
situations that have arisen today in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  In 2003 at the Naval War College, Dr. Anna Simons 
chaired a study for the Secretary of Defense composed of 
fifteen intellectuals, senior service members, and 
academics to determine what should be the desired 
characteristics of the officer corps in 2030.  The study 
looked at what should go into an officer’s education, 
training, and preparation to cultivate the right traits and 
attitudes needed for the military in 2030.  The study also 
urges that changes need to start taking place now, for 2030 
is too late.   
Through educational reform, the Army can amend the 
deficit within its educational system enabling America’s 
modern day Soldier to become the kind of warrior-diplomat 
who will be able to successfully thwart an insurgency and 
read a foreign country’s “social landscape.”  If the 
American Soldier is to be not just a “destroyer” but also a 
“diplomat”, he must be educated to know the terrain, his 
enemy, his own capabilities and limitations, and 
incorporate the indigenous population’s social landscape 
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VII. CONCLUSION  
War is not an affair of chance.  A great deal of 
knowledge, study, and meditation is necessary to 
conduct it well. 
--- Frederick the Great, Instructions to His Generals, 
1747, tr. Phillips, 1940  
The Army will never win the cultural battle overseas, 
if the government, schools, and other supporting 
organizations do not first tear down their own cultural 
walls.  At a recent hearing of the House Armed Services 
Committee, retired Major General Robert Scales made the 
point that:  
This cultural wall must be torn down.  Lives 
depend on it.  Every young Soldier should receive 
extensive cultural and language instruction… The 
success of counterinsurgency operations depends 
much more on the agility of mind than on any 
other single factor, and it’s the absence of this 
agility of mind that I suspect constrains us most 
today in Iraq… (Hedges, 2004).   
Interestingly, since 1798 the United States has been 
involved in 235 deployments of U.S. forces overseas, not 
including peace operations.  Of those ventures, 5 were 
declared wars and 8 can be considered undeclared wars, 
while the remainder of our conflicts – 222 – were small 
wars, insurgencies, and counter-insurgencies (Harp,ND, 
p.7).  Yet, given the preponderance and frequency of small 
wars versus large wars (222 vs. 13), our educational system 
remains configured to deal with the few and far between 
conventional wars rather then the much more common people’s 
war, or the kinds of struggles we are engaged in today in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and for the foreseeable future. 
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Multiple first-hand accounts, like Varhola’s, or those 
conveyed by any one of a number of other service members, 
reporters, and eye witnesses provide solid anecdotal 
evidence suggesting a need for a better understanding of 
insurgencies and foreign cultures when dealing with the 
complex situations that have arisen in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  Soldiers no longer need to be trained just to kill, 
but rather have to be given some of the tools needed by 
warrior-diplomats whose individual actions can have far-
reaching consequences not only on local and regional 
outcomes, but also on the world stage. 
As America’s military is transformed to meet the 
threats of the 21st Century, the Army must also transform 
her Soldiers.  Sadly, the Infantry squad’s Company 
Commander whose actions were mentioned at the beginning of 
this thesis didn’t have all the facts he needed, nor did 
the local population.  Haroun didn’t understand the 
Soldiers’ actions nor were they able to explain anything to 
him.  No one had learned the groundwork of fostering cross-
cultural understanding and awareness prior to the incident.  
Yet, surely this could have been done had the Soldiers on 
our side been better prepared to think like warrior-
diplomats, for the Army isn’t solely in the business of 
door kicking anymore—if it ever was.   
A. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
For the purposes of this thesis, our focus has been 
strictly on the U.S. Army.  An area of further research 
that should be explored is the education of the U.S. 
Marines, Airmen and Sailors.  Although each branch is 
responsible for training its individual members, we believe 
that all of the services should be jointly discussing 
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cultural education.  It is entirely possible that a 
combined effort, by an established Joint Task Force, could 
reduce research costs, eliminate conflicting information, 
as well as decrease the amount of time it would take to 
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APPENDIX A. ENLISTED PME 
 
Table 1.   ENLISTED PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
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APPENDIX B. OFFICER PME 
 
Table 2.   OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION CONTINUUM 
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